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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/03/2004

Accident number: 386

Accident time: 12:04

Accident Date: 16/09/2003

Where it occurred: 50 kms SE of Ondjiva
on road from Chiede to
Malungo via Shikongo
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Angola

Secondary cause: Other (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 26/09/2003

ID original source: KO

Name of source: MgM

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: SA No.8 AT blast

Ground condition: route/path

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 22/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: 6365 81000

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Melunga

Map series: SE33

Map edition: K1

Map sheet: 448

Map name: 1:100,000

Accident Notes
mechanical detonation (?)
no independent investigation available (?)

Accident report
An accident report was made available by the demining group involved in September 2003. It
is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Introduction:
On the 16th of September one of [demining group]’s Armoured Graders activated an anti-tank
mine during road clearance operations. This accident occurred approximately 50 kms south-
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east of Ondjiva on a road from Chiede to Malungo via Shikongo. After an investigation carried
out on site on the 19th of September the following are the finding and conclusions.

Description:
[Demining group] has been carrying out demining operations in the Chiede area, of
Namacunde District Cunene, Angola) since March 2003. This programme was instigated to
help with the relocation of IDPs and Refugees in the area following the cessation of hostilities
in Angola. The programme has mainly consisted of route clearance and EOD tasks to allow
safe relocation, and allow WFP to deliver food donations directly to the recipients, rather than
the nearest administrative centre.
On the 16th of September 2003 at 12:04 hours the Armoured Grader, assisting in route
clearance operations on the road from Chiede to Malungo wa Shikongo, set off an anti-tank
mine. The location of the accident was 32 kms south east of Chiede, while the grader was
advancing towards Malungo via Shikongo.
Reference:
Map:
Map Series:
Edition:
Map Number:
Scale:
Grid Ref.:

Melunga
SE33
K1
448
1:100,000
6365 81000

Assessment
The grader activated a mine under the right front wheel of the rear driving pair. Safety
distances were being observed, no support team members were involved and none were
injured. The accident occurred more than one kilometre from the nearest habitation, there
were no local population that were involved. Medical support was on site immediately the
area was made safe to extract the operator. The operator of the grader was shaken from the
experience and suffered some short term hearing loss. No injuries were sustained. Since this
accident the operator has been on compassionate leave with a family bereavement, so he
has still not been interviewed. Any relevant information gathered will be sent as an addendum
to this report, following his return to active operations.
The incident occurred approximately 50 metres from a previous mine blast on this road.
Information of the previous [explosion] is unavailable since it occurred during a period when
the area was occupied by foreign forces. The previous blast was evident by scorch marks on
surrounding trees. It was already known that the route clearance team would be passing
through a mined area. Information had been collected about this area, with the local
population reporting that recently one boy, a goat and four cows had been killed. The grader
suffered its accident in this mined area. To allow for safe extraction of the grader the area
around the grader was cleared. This allowed the [Demining group] Mechanical Recovery
Team to extract the grader for delivery to the [demining group] Workshop in Ondjiva for
damage assessment and repairs.
The operator usually makes a minimum of three runs from his start point when opening a
road, when clearing a lane a minimum of 8 metres width. Observing the area graded, the
blade was set at approximately 30cm depth in the soft sand, moving the spoil into a windrow
on the left-hand side of the vehicle. Under normal circumstances the operator would see an
anti-tank mine move into this windrow, stopping the vehicle and alerting the EOD support. In
this case it appear that one of two things occurred to allow the mine to pass under the blade.
Either:
The operator was coming to the end of his run and was lifting up the blade to drop
excess soil off before reversing down his cleared lane to restart on subsequent runs.
This would then have allowed the mine to pass under the blade as the grader rolled
forward to a stop.
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or
In the action of the grader exposing deeper historical layer in the ground, the mine
may have settled deeper than normal. This then would have allowed the mine to pass
under the blade, activating the mine in the lower levels of soft sand.
At present no [demining group] Residual Vapour Detection Dog (REVD) Teams are
operational. These are expected to come on line, after extensive training in Xangongo, early
in 2004. These teams would normally search graded routes and windrows to detect remaining
mines and other UXOs. These would then be removed and destroyed to allow for clearance
status.
The minefield will be properly surveyed, logged, marked and prioritised for future clearance.
The types of mines in the minefield are unknown. Fuzing mechanism from one anti-personnel
mine was found during clearance but no comparisons with known fuzes has been concluded.
It is assumed that the mine is some form of bounding fragmentation or fragmentation mine of
unknown origin. No fragmentation or other parts of the anti-tank mine have been located. It is
assumed to be of plastic/Bakelite manufacture, possibly a South African No.8 since the SADF
were active in this area and these mines have previously been found. More information on
located mines in this minefield will be passed on to the relevant authorities when information
is available.
The grader requires complete replacement of all components on the right hand front tandem
axle, from stub axle bearings outwards. Estimates for spare part costs for replacements, as
well as consumables, will be in the region of $6500. Slave armour plates had recently been
welded to the bottom of the grader to improve blast protection. These appear to have been
instrumental in protecting the underside of the grader from undue damage. Blast pressure in
the operators cab was eliminated as shown by the lack of dust in the cab or “blown out”
armoured glass windows.

Conclusions
The armour deflection and slave plates exceeded expectation on deflecting the blast from an
anti-tank mine.
The grader sustained minimal external damage and no structural damage.
The integrity of the armoured cab was not compromised. This resulted in no lasting injuries to
the operator.
Safety considerations were maintained, [demining group] SOPs were observed.
The accident, though unfortunate, was not unexpected. It is normal to expect occasional
detonations under the front wheels, which are extended, into un-graded areas. Extra armour
had been fitted in case of under-body detonations.
This accident is preferable to a missed mine being later detonated by a soft skinned vehicle.

Recommendations:
Reassess and alter, if necessary, the operation by the grader operator if a breakdown in
procedures is finally defined as the root cause.
Clear the route in front of the accident site to check for any more anti-tank mines. In view of
the threat probably being the No.8 anti-tank mine, manual excavation will have to be carried
out.
Routes not to be defined as cleared until final confirmation by [demining group] REVD Teams
When the [demining group] REVD Teams have been trained and deployed, these teams will
have to check and confirm all windrows and graded tracks.
Once the grader and operator are available [demining group] to carry on operations until the
arrival of the trained REVD Teams.
Signed: Programme Director, [Demining group], Angola.
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[In an interview shortly afterwards the driver said that his door was firmly closed at the time
and did not blow open.]

Victim Report
Victim number: 502

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: none

Time to hospital: not applicable

Protection issued: None

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hearing

COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
No medical report was made available. The victim was interviewed briefly on 6th October
2003 at which time we had returned to work. He reported a continued pain in one ear but no
perceived hearing loss. When asked if he had experienced any chest pain or difficulty
breathing he replied that he had not.

Analysis
This incident classification is as an “Excavation accident” because the grader was being used
to expose or excavate mines.
The primary and secondary causes as listed as “Unavoidable” and “Other” because the
demining group deployed the graders to prepare an area, not as a full-clearance tool. They
knew that the grader did not clear mines thoroughly and so an unintended initiation was
always a possibility. They planned for this by protecting the operator and important parts of
the machine with apparent success, even in a worst-case blast situation like this when a mine
detonates beneath the cab.
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